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The Financial Crisis and Financial crime: An Introduction 
 
A previously unattributed factor that contributed towards the most recent financial crisis is 
financial crime.
1
  However, it is important to note and accept that financial crime was not the 
sole and only cause of the financial crisis.  For example, it has been asserted by economists,
2
 
the International Monetary Fund,
3
 the United States Department of Treasury,
4
 HM Treasury,
5
 
official enquiries 
6
 and academic commentators 
7
 that the foundations of the financial crisis 
were laid as a result of the collapse of the United States subprime mortgage market.
8
  Others 
have argued that the foundations of the financial crisis were placed by the continued use of 
low interest rates by the Federal Reserve.
9
 Additional factors, which are beyond the scope of 
the article, include high levels of consumer debt,
10
 toxic debts,
11
 securitisation,
12
 deregulation 
                                                          
1
 An increasing amount of literature has suggested that financial crime was an important factor that contributed 
towards the most recent financial crisis. See for example Rydern N. The Financial Crisis and White Collar 
Crime: The Perfect Storm? (Edward Elgar, 2014), Ryder, N., Turksen, U. and Hassler, S. (eds), Fighting 
Financial Crime in the Global Economic Crisis: Policy, Trends and Sanctions (Routledge, 2014), Huisman, W. 
‘White-collar crime and the economic crisis’ (2012/2013) Newsletter of the European Society on Criminology 
11, Deflem, M. (ed), Economic crisis and crime (Bingley, 2011), Osoka, O., Trakkidi, A., Fisher, J., Blottiaux, 
M., Daniel, D., Oliveira, H. and Green, D. ‘The global financial crisis: the case for a stronger criminal response’ 
(2013) 7(3) Law & Financial Markets Review 159, Herlin-Karnell, E. ‘White-collar crime and European 
financial crises: getting tough on EU market abuse’ (2012) 37(4) European Law Review 481, Hardouin, P. ‘The 
aftermath of the financial crisis’ (2011) 18(2) Journal of Financial Crime 148, Creseney, A., Eng, G. and Nuttal, 
S. ‘Regulatory investigations and the credit crisis: the search for villains’” (2009) 46 American Criminal Law 
Review 225, and Posner, E. and Vermeule, A. ‘Crisis governance in the administrative state: 9/11 and the 
financial meltdown of 2008’ (2009) 76 University of Chicago Law Review 1613. 
2
 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. This time is different – eight centuries of financial folly (Princeton University 
Press: New Jersey, 2009). 
3
 See International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring 
Financial Soundness (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
4
 Department of Treasury Financial regulatory reform – A new foundation: Rebuilding financial supervision 
and regulation (Department of Treasury: London, 2009). 
5
 For an interesting commentary on the UK response to the financial crisis see Arora, A. Banking Law (Pearson: 
Harlow: 2014) at 123-167 and HM Government Review of HM Treasury’s management response to the 
financial crisis (HM Government: London, 2012). 
6
 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Washington DC, 2011).   
7
 For an interesting discussion of the subprime model see McDonald, O. ‘The American mortgage market’ 
(2012) Company Lawyer, 33(6), 183–184 and Yeoh, P. ‘Hedge funds: from privileged child to locust and now 
bogeyman?’ (2012) Company Lawyer, 33(2), 42–49.   
8
 Hereinafter ‘US’. 
9
 Taylor, J. The financial crisis and the policy responses: an empirical analysis of what went wrong (National 
Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, 2009). 
10
 See generally Dickerson, M. ‘Over-indebtedness, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the effect on US cities’ 
(2009) Fordham Urban Law Journal, 36, 395-425. 
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of banking legislation,
13
 ineffective macroeconomic policies,
14
 weak credit regulation,
15
 
deregulation of consumer credit legislation,
16
 the self-regulation of credit rating agencies,
17
 
the culture of some banking practices 
18
 and weak banking regulation.
19
  Initially, the link 
between the financial crisis and financial crime was difficult to quantify.  There is no ‘super 
villain’ that has become the face of financial crime during the financial crisis.  However, 
research has concluded that several different types of financial crime have interacted with the 
traditional variables, as outlined above, that contributed towards the financial crisis.  It is my 
contention that this includes the relationship between subprime mortgages and mortgage 
fraud, predatory lending, Ponzi fraud schemes, market misconduct and market 
manipulation.
20
 It is not the purpose of this article to review each of these in detail, but to 
critically consider the response in the United Kingdom by the financial regulator towards 
financial crime during and after the financial crisis.
21
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11
 Arsalidou, D. ‘The banking crisis: rethinking and refining the accountability of bank directors’ (2010) Journal 
of Business Law, 4, 284-310 at 292. 
12
 For a critical discussion of securitisation see Nwogugu, M. ‘Securitisation is illegal: racketeer influenced and 
corrupt organisations, usury, antitrust and tax issues’ (2008) Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation, 23(6), 316-332. 
13
 See Levitin, A. ‘The crisis without a face: emerging narratives of the financial crisis’ (2009) University of 
Miami Law Review, 63, 999-1010. 
14
 Gevurtz, G. ‘The role of corporate law in preventing a financial crisis: reflections on in re Citigroup Inc 
shareholder derivative litigation’ (2010) Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal, 23, 
113, at 3. 
15
 Choi, J. and Papaioannou, M. ‘Financial crisis and risk management: reassessing the Asian financial crisis in 
light of the American financial crisis’ (2010) East Asia Law Review, Summer, 5, 442–466, at 443 
16
 See for example the impact of the decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha 
Service Corp 439 U.S. at 299.  For a more detailed discussion of the impact of this case on the deregulation of 
the consumer credit market in the US see Schaefer, E. ‘The Credit Card Act of 2009 was not enough: a national 
usury rate would provide consumers with the protection they need’ (2012) University of Baltimore Law Review, 
Summer, 41, 741-767. 
17
 European Commission Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (European 
Commission: Brussels, 2009). 
18
 See generally Tomasic, R. ‘The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime’ (2011) Journal of 
Financial Crime, 18(1), 7–31. 
19
 Hutchins, A. ‘Flip That Prosecution Strategy: An Argument for Using RICO to Prosecute Large-Scale 
Mortgage Fraud’ (2011) Buffalo Law Review 59(1), 293 at 306. 
20
 See Ryder above, n 1. 
21
 For the purpose of this article the FSA and FCA will be referred to as the ‘regulator’.  Hereinafter ‘UK’. 
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Financial Regulatory Agencies and Financial Crime 
 
The Financial Services Act 1986 was heralded by the then Conservative government as 
providing the Securities and Investment Board with new prosecutorial and enforcement 
powers to tackle some aspects of financial crime.
22
  This is a view supported by Grey who 
took the view that “in order to ensure efficacious enforcement of the FSA [1986], the SIB has 
an impressive range of … powers”.23  For example, under the Financial Services Act 1986 
the SIB could apply for either an injunction or a restitution order against unauthorised 
investment businesses,
24
 it could bar financial practitioners from operating in the financial 
services industry 
25
 and it could apply to the court to wind up either an authorised person or 
an appointed representative.
26
  However, the prosecutorial role of the SIB was limited to the 
breaches relating to the authorisation to conduct investment business and insider dealing.
27
  
The enforcement performance of the SIB was hampered by their unwillingness to have a 
larger prosecutorial role 
28
 and the agency did little to tackle or even prevent commercial 
fraud.
29
  In addition, the Conservative government created the Serious Fraud Office 
30
 by 
virtue of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 
31
 following the recommendations of the Roskill 
                                                          
22
 Hereinafter ‘SIB’.  See Fishman, J. ‘A comparison of enforcement of securities law violations in the UK and 
US’ (1993) Company Lawyer 14(9) 163-172, at 163. 
23
 For a more detailed commentary on these provisions of the FSA 1986 see Grey, J. ‘Financial Services Act 
1986 Reforms: Part 2’ (1991) International Banking Law 9(9) 412-416, at 415. 
24
 Financial Services Act 1986, s. 6. 
25
 Financial Services Act 1986, s. 59.   
26
 Financial Services Act 1986, s. 71 and 72.   
27
 For a more detailed discussion of the enforcement of the insider dealing provisions of the FSA 1986 see 
Lomnicka, E. ‘Curtailing section 62 accountability’ (1991) Journal of Business Law July 353-360 and Alcock, 
A. ‘Insider dealing – how die we get here’ (1994) Company Lawyer 15(3) 67-72. 
28
 It must be noted that the FSA 1986 did provide the SIB with fraud enforcement powers under section 47.  For 
a more detailed analysis see Barnett, W. ‘Fraud enforcement in the Financial Services Act 1986: an analysis and 
discussion of section 47’ (1996) The Company Lawyer 17(7) 203. 
29
 See Rider, B. ‘Policing the city – combating fraud and other abuses in the corporate securities industry’ 
(1988) Current Legal Problems 41 47-68 and Long, J. ‘Policing the markets – SIB’s role’ (1994) 15(3) 83-85. 
30
 Hereinafter ‘SFO’.  See generally Wright, R. ‘Fraud after Roskill: A view from the Serious Fraud Office’, 
(2003) Journal of Financial Crime, 11(1), 10-16. 
31
 Criminal Justice Act 1987, s. 1. 
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Committee.
32
  The initial remit of the SFO was to tackle serious and complex fraud, yet this 
has been extended to include bribery and corruption following the enactment of the Bribery 
Act 2010.
33
  The SFO was established following the era of financial deregulation in the 
1980s, which resulted in the city of London being perceived as an epicentre for financial 
criminals.
34
  However, the effectiveness of the SFO has been questioned on many 
occasions.
35
  For example, its reputation was tarnished by a several notorious prosecutorial 
failures including Guinness,
36
 Blue Arrow,
37
 Maxwell 
38
 and Levitt.
39
  Furthermore, the SFO 
has been in the headlines for its handling of the bribery allegations against BAE Systems and 
its abandonment of the investigation into arms sales in Saudi Arabia.
40
  In 2012, the SFO was 
                                                          
32
 The Committee was asked to ‘consider in what ways the conduct of criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales arising from fraud can be improved and to consider what changes in existing law and procedure would be 
desirable to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of such proceedings’. See Fraud Trials 
Committee Report (1986) HMSO. 
33
 For a more detailed discussion see Ryder, N. ‘The Legal Mechanisms to control Bribery and Corruption’. In: 
Rider, B. (eds) Research Handbook on International Financial Crimes, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2015, 381-
393. 
34
 Bosworth-Davies, R. ‘Investigating financial crime: the continuing evolution of the public fraud investigation 
role – a personal perspective’, (2009) Company Lawyer, 30(7), 195-199, at 196. 
35
 See for example de Grazia, J. Review of the Serious Fraud Office – Final Report (Serious Fraud Office 2008),  
HM Crown Prosecution Service, Inspectorate Review of the Fraud Prosecution Service (HM Crown Prosecution 
Service Inspectorate: London, 2008), and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate Report of the Attorney 
General on the inspection of the Serious Fraud Office (HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate: London, 
2012). 
36
 For a more detailed discussion see Sarker, R. ‘The trials and errors of the Guinness four’ (1995) Journal of 
Financial Crime, 3(1), 86-. 
37
 For a more detailed discussion of this case see Cohen, H. ‘What place does the criminal law have in the 
regulation of securities markets after the Blue Arrow trials?’ (1992) Journal of International Banking Law, 
7(10), 420-. 
38
 For a more detailed discussion see Sarker, R. ‘Maxwell: fraud trial of the century (Case Comment)’ (1996) 
Company Lawyer, 17(4), 116-117 and Honess, T. ‘Juror competence in processing complex information: 
implications from a simulation of the Maxwell trial’ (1998) Criminal Law Review, November 763-773. 
39
 For a more detailed discussion see Sarker, R. ‘The Serious Fraud Office - quo vadis?’ (1995) Company 
Lawyer, 16(2), 56-61. 
40
 For a more detailed discussion see Williams, S. ‘The BAE/Saudi Al-Yamamah contracts: implications in law 
and public procurement’ (2008) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 57(1), 200-209 and Rose, C. 
‘Legislative Comment The UK Bribery Act 2010 and accompanying guidance: belated implementation of the 
OECD Anti- Bribery Convention’ (2012) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2012, 61(2), 484-499.  
The decision by the SFO to terminate its investigation into sale of arms in Saudi Arabia was subject to a judicial 
review and the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court determined that the decision was unlawful.  See The Queen on 
the application of (1) Corner House Research (2) Campaign Against Arms Trade v The Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office (Defendant) and BAE Systems Plc (Interested Party), Claim No CO/1567/2007, High Court of 
Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Administrative Court, 18 April 2007.  However, this decision was overturned 
on appeal by House of Lords.  See R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of 
the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, 30 July 2008, para 11.  For a more detailed discussion of this case 
and the related legal issues see Yihdego, Z. ‘Arms trade and public controls: the right to information 
perspective’ (2008) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 59(4), 379-394; Spencer, J. ‘Fiat justicia, ruatque 
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severely criticized over its poor handling of the Tchenguiz brother’s investigation.41  
However, it is important to emphasize that the SFO has increased the frequency of its 
investigations and prosecutions, against a political background of severe financial restrictions 
imposed by the Coalition government.
42
  For example, between 2001 and 2006, the SFO 
reported a conviction rate of 61%.
43
  This increased to 71% in 2007.
44
  By 2008, the 
conviction rate had fallen slightly to 68%.
45
  In 2009, the SFO achieved a conviction rate of 
91%,
46
 84% in 201, 73% in 2011,
47
  70% in 2012,
48
 85% in 2013 
49
 and 78% in 2014.
50
 
 
The need to review and reform the relationship between financial regulation and financial 
crime legislation was hastened following the catastrophic collapse of Bank of Credit 
Commerce International 
51
 and the failure of Barings Bank.
52
 As a result, the then newly 
elected Labour Government announced in May 1997 that it intended to create a single super 
regulator for the UKs financial services sector, the Financial Services Authority.
53
  The 
reduction of financial crime became one of the Regulator’s then four statutory objectives, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concordia cum Arabe?’ (2008) Cambridge Law Journal, 67(3), 456-458 and Roberts, A. ‘Prosecution: Director 
of SFO - lawfulness of decision to discontinue prosecution’ (2009) Criminal Law Review, 1, 46-49. 
41
 See for example Neate, R. ‘Tchenguiz brothers seek millions from Serious Fraud Office’, December 3 2012, 
available from http://m.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/dec/03/tchenguiz-brothers-millions-damages-sfo, accessed 
18 March 2015, Russel, J. ‘Tchenguiz brothers launch damages case against SFO’, 2 December 2012, available 
from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9717240/Tchenguiz-brothers-launch-damages-case-
against-SFO.html, accessed 18 March 2015,  
42
 See generally Ryder, N. ‘White collar crime and the global financial crisis; how long will we have to wait for 
the day of reckoning?’ (2013) The Criminal Lawyer, 57(Jul), 5-14. 
43
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report 2006/2007 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2007) at 4. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report 2007/2008 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2008) at 5. 
46
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report 2009/2010 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2010) at 2. 
47
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report and Accounts 2011/2012 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2012) at 6. 
48
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report and Accounts 2012/2013 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2013) at 4. 
49
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report and Accounts 2013/2014 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2014) at 1. 
50
 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report and Accounts 2014/2015 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2015) at 1. 
51
 For an excellent discussion of the collapse of BCCI see Arora, A. ‘The statutory system of the bank 
supervision and the failure of BCCI’ (2006) Journal of Business Law, August, 487-510. 
52
 For a more detailed and analytical account of the collapse of Barings see Proctor, L. ‘The Barings collapse: a 
regulatory failure, or a failure of supervision’ (1997) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 22, 735 
53
 Lomnicka, E. ‘Reforming U.K. financial services regulation: the creation of a single regulator’ (1999) Journal 
of Business Law, September, 480-489, at 482.  Hereinafter ‘FSA’. 
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it has been regarded by this author as one of the most innovative aspects of FSMA 2000.
54
  In 
order to achieve this statutory objective the regulator was given a plethora of investigative 
and enforcement powers.  For example, the regulator has become a prosecuting authority for 
money laundering, a limited number of fraud related offences and insider dealing.  It also has 
the power to impose financial sanctions where it establishes that there has been a 
contravention by an authorised person of any of its requirements.
55
  Furthermore, the FSA 
had the power to ban authorized persons and firms from undertaking any regulated activity.
56
   
By virtue of the Financial Services Act 2012, the FSA was replaced by the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the financial crime statutory objective was removed and it is now associated 
with the FCAs consumer protection and market integrity objectives.
57
  The FCA stated that 
“one of our objectives is to ensure the integrity of the markets … a key part of that is 
ensuring that our markets operate honestly and that the firms we regulate understand, and 
manage, the financial crime risks that they face”.58  Hill stated that “the FCA must also have 
regard to taking action in relation to financial crime. This will be a freestanding duty to take 
action in relation to any fraud, dishonesty, misconduct and handling the proceeds of crime”.59  
The regulator will continue to concentrate its resources towards maintaining “standards of 
conduct in the financial services industry”.60 This means that the FCA will adopt a very 
similar approach towards the reduction of financial crime as that adopted by the FSA, namely 
that regulated firms must have appropriate systems and controls.  Another legacy left by the 
                                                          
54
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 6.  See generally Ryder, N. ‘The Financial Services Authority, 
the Reduction of Financial Crime and the Money Launderer – A Game of Cat and Mouse’, (2008) Cambridge 
Law Journal, 67(3), 635-653. 
55
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 206 (1).  For a general discussion see Travers Smith Regulatory 
Investigations Group ‘FSA enforcement action: themes and trends’ (2011) Compliance Officer Bulletin, 87, 
June, 1-35. 
56
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 56.  
57
 Financial Conduct Authority ‘Fighting financial crime’, March 31 2013, available from 
http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/protecting/financial-crimem accessed July 8 2013.  Hereinafter ‘FCA’. 
58
 Ibid.   
59
 Hill, C. ‘Fund management update’ (2013) Compliance Officer Bulletin, 104(Mar), 1-36, at 30. 
60
 Srivastava, A., Mason, I., Simpson, M. and Litt, M. ‘Financial Crime’ (2011) Compliance Officer Bulletin, 
86(May), 1-23, at 9. 
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FSA are the “the tools that are currently available to the FSA. It will be able to impose 
penalties for market abuse, instigate criminal proceedings for insider dealing and market 
manipulation and it will act as a ‘competent authority’ in relation to money laundering”.61  
Furthermore, the FCA will be expected to follow and further develop the FSA’s credible 
deterrence strategy.
62
  This would involve the FCA continuing to “taking tough, targeted, 
effective and public action against misconduct perpetrated by firms and individuals”.63  
However, it is important to note that there is an expectation that the FCA will be more 
proactive than its predecessor by initiating more cases and imposing stronger penalties.
64
  
Therefore, in light of this the article now turns to critically review the use of civil and 
criminal mechanisms since the onset of the most recent financial crisis.  
 
Civil sanctions and credible deterrence 
 
One of the most commonly utilised powers by the regulator has been its ability to impose 
financial sanctions where it establishes that there has been a contravention by an authorised 
person of any requirement under FSMA 2000.
65
  The highest profile financial sanctions 
imposed since the financial crisis has been over the manipulation of the London Interbank 
Borrowed Rate and the Foreign Exchange Currency Market.
66
  For example, in 2012 the 
regulator concluded that Barclays Bank had manipulated the both the dollar LIBOR and the 
EURIBOR rates of interest after being asked by derivative traders and other banking 
                                                          
61
 Hill above, n 59 at 30. 
62
 Srivastava et al above, n 62 at 10. 
63
 Hill above, n 59 at 30. 
64
 Marshall, H., Leonard, C. and Siriwardhane, A. ‘The regulation of short selling in the UK’ (2009) 
Compliance Officer Bulletin, 63(Feb), 1-29, at 9. 
65
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 206 (1).   
66
 Hereinafter ‘LIBOR’ and ‘FORX’.  It is important to also state that the regulator has also imposed financial 
penalties for other types of financial crime including money laundering, fraud and bribery.   
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institutions.
67
 The regulator noted that Barclays had acted inappropriately by “making LIBOR 
submissions which took into account concerns over the negative media perception of 
Barclays’ LIBOR submissions”.68  This is of particular relevance to link between the 
financial crisis and the illegal activities of Barclays.  This was a point raised by the regulator 
who reported: 
 
“Liquidity issues were a particular focus for Barclays and other banks during the 
financial crisis and banks’ LIBOR submissions were seen by some commentators as a 
measure of their ability to raise funds. Barclays was identified in the media as having 
higher LIBOR submissions than other contributing banks at the outset of the financial 
crisis. Barclays believed that other banks were making LIBOR submissions that were 
too low and did not reflect market conditions. The media questioned whether Barclays’ 
submissions indicated that it had a liquidity problem. Senior management at high levels 
within Barclays expressed concerns over this negative publicity”.69 
 
The regulator added that the concerns raised by members of senior management of Barclays 
resulted in “instructions being given by less senior managers at Barclays to reduce LIBOR 
submissions in order to avoid negative media comment”.70  The regulator concluded that this 
conduct breached several of its Principles of Business and stated that Barclays had “fail[ed] 
to conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence when considering issues rose 
internally in relation to its LIBOR submissions”.71 Barclays Bank Plc was fined £59.5m by 
                                                          
67
 Financial Services Authority ‘Barclays fined £59.5 million for significant failings in relation to LIBOR and 
EURIBOR’, June 27 2012, available from http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/barclays-fined-595-
million-libor-euribor, accessed February 8 2016. 
68
 Financial Services Authority Final notice to Barclays Bank Plc (Financial Services Authority: London, 2012) 
at 3. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Financial Services Authority above, n 68 at 3. 
71
 Ibid. 
10 
 
the regulator and their conduct was strongly condemned by the HM Treasury Select 
Committee.
72
  The second bank to be fined (£160m) due to its manipulation of LIBOR was 
UBS in December 2012.
73
  The regulator concluded that between January 2005 and 
December 2010, UBS breached Regulations 3 and 5 of the Principles of Business when the 
bank engaged in illegal behaviour regarding the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR.
74
  The 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) became the third bank to be fined in February 2013 following 
the revelations of LIBOR rigging.  The regulator fined RBS £87.5m for its conduct between 
January 2006 and November 2010.
75
  The overall fine would have been £125m had it not 
been for a 30% discount granted by the regulator.  The conduct of the banks employees was 
not limited to the UK, it occurred in Japan, Singapore and the US.  According to the 
regulator, the illegal conduct was extensive and “219 requests for inappropriate submissions 
were documented – an unquantifiable number of oral requests, which by their nature would 
not be documented, were also made. At least 21 individuals including derivatives and money 
market traders and at least one manager were involved in the inappropriate conduct”.76  The 
regulator added that “the failures at RBS were all the more serious because of the attempts 
not only to influence the submissions of RBS but also of other panel banks and the use of 
interdealer brokers to do this … the extent and nature of the misconduct relating to LIBOR 
has cast a shadow on the reputation of this industry and we expect firms to take steps to 
ensure that this can never happen again”.77  The regulator imposed another financial penalty 
of £14m on ICAP European Limited in September 2013 for an embarrassing amount of 
                                                          
72
 HM Treasury Select Committee Fixing LIBOR: some preliminary findings (HM Treasury: London, 2012) at 
21. 
73
 Financial Services Authority ‘UBS fined £160 million for significant failings in relation to LIBOR and 
EURIBOR’, December 19 2012, available from 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/116.shtml, accessed February 5 2016. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Financial Services Authority ‘RBS fined £87.5m for significant failings in relation to LIBOR’ 6 February 
2013, available from http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2013/011.shtml, accessed 8
th
 February 
2013. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Financial Services Authority above, n 75. 
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misconduct that involved the firm’s traders colluding the UBS traders to manipulate the 
(Japanese Yen) JPY LIBOR rates and one trader receiving bonus or corrupt payments for 
assisting in the manipulation.
78
  In October 2013, Rabobank was fined by the regulator 
£105m for “poor internal controls encouraged collusion between traders and LIBOR 
submitters and allowed systematic attempts at benchmark manipulation”.79  The regulator 
added that “The FCA found over 500 instances of attempted LIBOR manipulation, directly or 
indirectly involving at least 9 managers and 19 other individuals based across the world.  At 
least one manager was actively involved in attempted manipulation and facilitated a culture 
where this practice appeared to be accepted, or even endorsed by the bank”.80 In July 2014, 
Lloyds TSB was fined £104m by the regulator for breaches of the LIBOR and other 
benchmarks.
81
  Additionally, Martin Brokers (UK) Limited was fined £630,000 for 
significant failings in relation to LIBOR.
82
  The key question that must be addressed here is 
whether the financial penalties will deter future misconduct in the financial services sector?  
Evidence suggests that the impact of these fines on the financial services sector is extremely 
limited and that the financial services sector continues to be troubled by misconduct.  This 
was soon illustrated the imposition of these record breaking financial penalties following the 
manipulation of FOREX.  For example, in November 2014 the regulator fined five banks a 
total of £1.1bn for “failing to control business practices … in their foreign exchange trading 
                                                          
78
 Financial Conduct Authority ‘ICAP Europe Limited fined £14 million for significant failings in relation to 
LIBOR’, September 25 2013, available from http://www.fca.org.uk/news/icap-europe-limited-fined, accessed 
February 6 2016. 
79
 Financial Conduct Authority ‘The FCA fines Rabobank £105 million for serious LIBOR-related misconduct’, 
October 29 2013, available from http://www.fca.org.uk/news/the-fca-fines-rabobank-105-million-for-serious-
libor-related-misconduct, accessed February 6 2016. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Financial Conduct Authority  ‘Lloyds Banking Group fined £105m for serious LIBOR and other benchmark 
failings’, 28 September 2015, available from https://www.fca.org.uk/news/lloyds-banking-group-fined-105m-
libor-benchmark-failings, accessed February 2 2016. 
82
 Financial Conduct Authority ‘Martin Brokers (UK) Limited fined £630,000 for significant failings in relation 
to LIBOR’, May 15 2014, available from http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/martin-brokers-uk-limited-
fined-630000-for-significant-failings-in-relation-to-libor, accessed February 6 2016. 
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operations”.83  In this instance, the regulator fined Citibank £225m, HSBC Bank Plc 
£216.3m, JP Morgan Chase Bank £222.1m, RBS £217m and UBS AG £233m.  Martin 
Wheatley, the then had of the regulator boldly claimed:  
 
“The FCA does not tolerate conduct which imperils market integrity or the wider UK 
financial system. Today’s record fines mark the gravity of the failings we found and 
firms need to take responsibility for putting it right. They must make sure their traders 
do not game the system to boost profits or leave the ethics of their conduct to 
compliance to worry about. Senior management commitments to change need to 
become a reality in every area of their business”.84 
 
In May 2015, Barclays was fined by the regulator £284.4m for “failing to control business 
practices in its foreign exchange business in London”.85  The regulator condemned the 
actions of Barclays and stated that “this is another [author’s emphasis] example of a firm 
allowing unacceptable practices to flourish on the trading floor”.86  The regulator also 
imposed a financial penalty on Mark Stevenson in 2014 for manipulating gilt prices during 
quantitative easing.
87 
 
                                                          
83
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Another civil sanction available to the regulator is a prohibition.
88
  One area in which these 
have been extensively used is mortgage fraud, which has “been identified as a contributor to 
the financial crisis”.89 Srivastava et al stated that “the FSA has banned 92 mortgage brokers 
and imposed fines of around £1.5m”.90  In 2008/2009, the FSA imposed prohibition orders on 
58 individuals,
91
 and it is very interesting to note that out of the 58 prohibition orders, 23 of 
them were mortgage fraud related.
92
  The number of prohibition orders slightly decreased in 
2009/2010 to 56,
93
 but increased to 71 in 2010/2011.
94
  However, the numbers dropped to 47 
in 2011,
95
 45 in 2012,
96
 26 in 2013 
97
 and 26 in 2014.
98
  An illustration of FSA issuing a 
prohibition order was against Peter Cummins, the former CEO of HBOS.
99
  Additionally, he 
was fined £500,000 for his “breaching Statement of Principle 6 of the FSA’s Code of Practice 
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for Approved Persons, by failing to exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing 
HBOS’s Corporate Division”.100  The regulator stated that: 
 
“Despite being aware of the weaknesses in his division and growing problems in the 
economy, Cummings presided over a culture of aggressive growth without the controls 
in place to manage the risks associated with that strategy. Instead of reacting to the 
worsening environment, he raised his targets as other banks pulled out of the same 
markets.  It is essential that senior executives understand that incentivizing revenue 
over risk is a dangerous folly. Growth is a sound ambition for any business but risk 
must be properly managed and robust controls are imperative to ensure growth is 
achieved in a way that is both stable and sustainable”.101 
 
The financial predicament that HBOS faced just after the start of the financial crisis was 
succinctly summarized by Tomasic and Akinbani who stated “the deterioration in the 
financial position of HBOS was largely attributable to heavy lending to its corporate 
customers involved in property development; while its retail arm was scheduled to make a 
profit of £1.2bn … its corporate lending arm was scheduled to make a loss of almost 
£6.8bn”.102  Willmot and James described the issue of a prohibition order against Peter 
Cummins as “the first case that the FSA has pursued in which disciplinary action is taken in 
relation to the core business risks taken by the firm … in this case, the bank’s decision as to 
whether or not to lend its own money to customers … This is unprecedented in the 11 years 
of the FSA’s existence and marks a very important shift in the FSA’s own view of its 
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regulatory remit”.103  Another example of the regulator using prohibition orders was 
illustrated in July 2010, when it banned and fined the former finance director of Northern 
Rock, David Jones, for misrepresenting mortgage arrears figures.
104
  Furthermore, the 
regulator fined and banned the former deputy chief executive and credit director of Northern 
Rock for also misreporting mortgage arrears figures.
105
  However, the implementation of a 
prohibition order against Peter Cummins can be contrasted with the lack of enforcement 
action against two other bankers, Fred Goodwin and Johnny Cameron.  Johnny Cameron, the 
former Executive Director of RBS, was under investigation by the regulator.  However, 
unlike Peter Cummins, the regulator reached a settlement with Jonny Cameron, who agreed 
that he will not “perform any significant influence function in relation to any regulated 
activity carried on by any authorized person, exempt person or exempt professional firm” or 
“undertake any further full time employment in the financial services industry”.106  It is 
important to stress that that James Cameron made no admission of guilt and in response to the 
decision by the regulator and he stated “given the losses sustained by RBS in 2008, as a 
director of the RBS, I recognise that it is appropriate that I take my share of responsibility, 
and I will not be seeking another managerial role in the financial services industry”.107   
 
The highest profile former banker who the regulator decided not to take action against was 
Fred Goodwin, who was the CEO of RBS between 2001 and 2009.  During his tenure, Fred 
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Goodwin oversaw what can be classified as a ‘boom’ time for RBS.  By 2008, the bank had 
demonstrated rapid growth and its assets totalled £1.9tn and it was the fifth largest bank on 
the stock exchange.  Fred Goodwin was “deemed by the banking world and by the 
government to have a Midas touch. He advised the government on banking matters and was 
knighted for his services. He could do no wrong”.108  However, this persona changed after 
RSB’s ill-advised purchase in 2007 of ABN Amro for £48bn,109 which was unsurprising 
given his eagerness to expand the size of RBS via acquiring other banks.
110
 Huisman stated 
that “Fred Goodwin … is the embodiment of all that is apparently wrong in the financial 
sectors and which caused the financial crisis.  He is seen as responsible for the disastrous 
acquisition of … ABN Amro Bank and the resulting rescue operation of the government”.111  
This approach was flawed and extremely risky because Fred Goodwin was “known for the 
way in which he aggressively cut costs within the bank”.112  This created the perfect cocktail 
of events that contributed to the bank suffering the largest annual corporate loss in UK 
history,
113
 and the part nationalisation of RBS.  The regulator decided against pursuing any 
action against Fred Goodwin.
114
  Despite no action being taken against Fred Goodwin he has 
offered a “profound and unqualified apology for all of the distress that has been caused”.115  
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What has transpired since the financial crisis can be described as a tepid approach towards 
enforcing the financial crime provisions of FSMA 2000.  The regulator has clearly favoured 
imposing financial sanctions on firms and individuals as opposed to instigating criminal 
proceedings, as part of its credible deterrence policy.
116
 However, the credible deterrence 
policy has resulted in the FSA adopting a different approach towards imposing financial 
sanctions by imposing them on individuals and not just firms.  This was summarised by Peat 
and Mason who stated: 
 
“The FSA’s policy of credible deterrence in enforcement cases involves bringing action 
not just against firms, but also against individuals. The normal sanction imposed on a 
firm is a financial penalty; the firm pays the fine and then carries on with its normal 
business. In contrast a sanction imposed on an individual may have longer-lasting 
consequences, for example a prohibition order may prevent an individual from working 
in the financial services industry for a period of years, and this has a greater deterrent 
effect”.117 
 
It has been argued that the objective of the credible deterrence policy is to “deliver a message 
that breaches of law and/or regulation will result in offenders suffering ‘meaningful 
consequences’ including imprisonment”.118  Teasdale stated that the “credible deterrence 
agenda has relied upon not only securing meaningful convictions, judgments and regulatory 
decisions, but also upon clearly advertising them; to the regulated community to dissuade 
                                                          
116
 Financial Services Authority ‘Delivering credible deterrence’, speech by Margaret Cole, Director of 
Enforcement, FSA, Annual Financial Crime Conference, 27 April 2009, available from 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0427_mc.shtml, accessed 8 March 2013. 
117
 Peat, R. and Mason, I. ‘Credible deterrence in action: the FSA brings a series of cases against traders’ (2009) 
Company Lawyer, 30(9), 278-279 at 278. 
118
 Srivastava et al above, n 62 at 8. 
18 
 
similar behaviour, and to the wider world to engender consumer and market confidence”.119 
Lewis et al stated that the regulator has “levied large fines and, at worst, bans, on firms and 
relevant approved individuals who breached its rules – sometimes regardless of whether the 
breach has resulted in actual harm to customers”.120  This point is clearly illustrated by the 
significant increase in the use of financial sanctions since the start of the financial crisis by 
the regulator.
121
 Srivastava et al stated “financial sanctions have assumed greater political 
importance in recent years and as a result there has been increased focus on the part of the 
FSA in ensuring that firms understand their obligations under the various financial sanctions 
regimes”.122  For example, in 2007 the regulator imposed a total of £5.3m financial 
sanctions.
123
  A year later, it reported that the figure had increased to £22.7m.
124
  In 2009 the 
amount of financial sanctions increased to £35m.
125
  The figures for 2010 and 2011 illustrated 
an increase to £89.1m 
126
 and a decrease to £66.1m.
127
  However, in 2012 the regulator 
imposed financial sanctions that amounted to £311.5m,
128
 a majority of which are associated 
with the LIBOR scandal.   In 2013, the regulator had imposed financial sanctions totalling 
£474.2m,
129
 whilst in 2014 the total amount of fines imposed totalled £1.4bn.
130
  In 2015, the 
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regulator levied fines totalling £905m.
131
  At the time of writing this article the regulator has 
imposed fined totalling £15.5m.
132
  At first glance, these financial penalties demonstrate the 
imposition of record breaking financial penalties.  However, these financial penalties can be 
criticised because they only represent a very small percentage of the profits generated by the 
financial institutions who have been subjected to enforcement action.  The imposition of 
‘media friendly’ financial penalties represents a worrying trend towards large financial 
institutions who have been involved in illegal activities.  For example, the regulator has 
imposed record penalties on financial institutions who manipulated the LIBOR and FOREX 
markets yet they were reluctant to initiate criminal proceedings.  This situation is extremely 
undesirable and somewhat surprising given the ability of the regulator to act as prosecutorial 
agency.  For example, the FCA is able to prosecute a firm or individual who falsely claims to 
be authorised, where a firm undertakes a regulated activity without authorisation, where the 
firm makes a misleading statement that leads to an investment and where a firm or individual 
fails to co-operate with an FCA investigation.  Additionally, the FCA is able to prosecute 
insider dealing offences,
133
 misleading statements,
134
 misleading statement relating to 
benchmarks,
135
 breaches of the Money Laundering Regulations and terrorist financing.
136
  
The origins of these powers are to be found in s 401 and 402 FSMA 2000 and were 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in R v Rollins,
137
 where the court held that the regulator 
were able to prosecute offences that were not limited to FSMA 2000.  However, it is 
important to note that these financial penalties are belittled when compared to those imposed 
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in the US.  For example, in August 2014 Bank of America greed to settle charges and paid 
$16.65bn brought by the Department of Justice that it had sold defective mortgage securities 
before the start of the financial crisis.
138
  Furthermore, in December 2012 HSBC agreed to 
pay the Department of Justice $1.2bn for having inadequate anti-money laundering 
controls.
139
   
 
In addition to the financial sanctions and prohibition orders imposed by the regulator, they 
are able to use a series of preventive measures via its Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls, or SYSC part of the Handbook.  Part 3 provides that firms must have 
in place systems and controls which are appropriate for the firm to conduct its business.
140
 In 
particular, a firm is required to “take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective 
systems and controls for compliance with applicable requirements and standards under the 
regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial 
crime”.141 Therefore, authorized firms are required to undertake consistent assessments of the 
adequacy of their systems to prevent themselves from being used to facilitate financial 
crime,
142
 allocate a director/senior manager with overall responsibility for establishing and 
the maintaining of the financial crime.
143
 The regime is intended to provide the regulated 
sector with an even higher degree of flexibility. This means that firms are able to identify the 
risks and determine how they can best allocate their resources in areas which are most 
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vulnerable.
144
  Failure to comply with these measures triggered significant enforcement 
activity by the regulator.  For example, in May 2013 JP Morgan was fined £3m by the 
regulator for systems and controls failings in its wealth management business.
145
  This was 
soon followed by a £28m fine on Lloyds TSB for failings in the systems and controls 
governing financial incentives to sales staff”.146  In 2014, Barclays was once again sanctioned 
by the regulator and fined £26m for “failing to adequately manage conflicts of interest 
between itself and its customers as well as systems and controls failings, in relation to the 
Gold Fixing”.147  Furthermore, September 2013 JP Morgan Chase Bank was fined over 
£137m by the FCA for serious failing relating to the ‘London Whale’ trades.148  Tracey 
McDermott, the FCA’s director of enforcement and financial crime stated: 
 
“When the scale of the problems at JPMorgan became apparent, it sent a shock-wave 
through the markets. Maintaining the integrity of markets is a key part of our wholesale 
conduct agenda. We consider JPMorgan’s failings to be extremely serious such as to 
undermine the trust and confidence in UK financial markets.  This is yet another 
example of a firm failing to get a proper grip on the risks its business poses to the 
market. There were basic failings in the operation of fundamental controls over a high 
risk part of the business. Senior management failed to respond properly to warning 
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signals that there were problems in the CIO. As things began to go wrong, the firm 
didn’t wake up quickly enough to the size and the scale of the problems. What is worse, 
they compounded this by failing to be open and co-operative with us as their 
regulator”.149 
It is also important to note that in relation to this penalty, the regulator fined Achilles Macris 
£792,900 for failing to co-operate with the regulator during the ‘London Whale’ trades.150  
However, the imposition of these financial sanctions can only result in one conclusion, that 
they measures are ineffective and have failed to prevent breaches of relevant rules by 
authorized firms.   
 
The instigation of criminal proceedings 
 
One of the most contentious issues surrounding the enforcement activities of the regulator is 
its ability to commence criminal proceedings.  The regulator has the ability to prosecute for a 
wide range of criminal activities.
151
  For example, the regulator can prosecute, inter alia, 
carrying on or purporting to carry on a regulated activity without authorisation or exemption, 
152
 making false claims to be authorised or exempt 
153
 and performing or agreeing to perform 
functions in breach of a prohibition order.
154
 Furthermore, the regulator is able to pursue 
criminal proceedings for where someone offers securities to the public before publishing a 
prospectus required by listing rules,
155
 failing to cooperate with, or giving false information 
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to appointed investigators,
156
 failing to comply with provisions about control over authorised 
persons,
157
 making false claims to be a person to whom the general prohibition does not 
apply,
158
 providing false or misleading information to an auditor,
159
 disclosing confidential 
information,
160
 failure by a director of an insurer carrying on long−term insurance business to 
notify the regulator of a general meeting to propose a resolution for voluntary winding up 
161
 
and misleading the regulator.
162
  The Financial Services Act 2012 created three new criminal 
offences following the LIBOR scandal which included making misleading statements,
163
 
misleading impressions 
164
 and misleading statements etc in relation to benchmarks.
165
  
Additionally, the regulator is able to commence prosecutions for insider dealing,
166
 money 
laundering 
167
 and terrorist financing.
168
  The criminalisation of insider dealing has attracted a 
great deal of discussion amongst interested academics and is beyond the scope of this 
article,
169
 yet it is interest to note that the regulator appears to taking a more robust stance 
towards this illegal activity.  Alexander notes the increasing regulatory intensity in referring 
to a speech by Margaret Cole, then then Director of the FSA’s Enforcement Division where 
she emphasized that the FSA would be seeking to increase the number of criminal 
prosecutions it brings,
170
 with others within the FSA calling it “one of the most significant 
changes in our approach” and that shortly after this speech the regulator obtained its first 
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conviction for insider dealing.
171
 This increase in intensity and focus toward criminal 
prosecutions has borne fruit with the first criminal conviction for insider dealing brought by 
the FSA in which a solicitor was sentenced to eight months for passing on information to his 
father-in- law about an impending takeover.
172
 Despite this optimism though, a freedom of 
information request in 2014 illustrates that the regulator only made four arrests in 2012, one 
in 2011, 17 in 2010, 16 in 2009 and 11 in 2008.
173
 Following the realignment of financial 
regulation system, the spotlight has now turned onto the FCA and it is to them that we now 
look for better regulation and an increase in prosecution and conviction rates.   
 
However, there is some uncertainty if the regulator is able to enforce its own fraud policy and 
instigate criminal proceedings.
174
  For example, the regulator stated that “we cannot prosecute 
most types of fraud and dishonesty … in contrast with money laundering; we have no direct 
powers to prosecute fraud or dishonesty offences. Prosecution is the responsibility of other 
law enforcement agencies”.175  This explanation was reiterated by Lord Turner, the former 
Chairman of the regulator, who said: 
 
“My understanding is that the FSA is not [authors emphasis] able to bring a criminal 
case in the UK. If it falls within the category of fraud, which is a general category of 
malfeasance quite separate from financial regulation, the Serious Fraud Office has a 
right to look at it, and we have been in contact with the SFO throughout this. I think 
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that it announced a week or so ago that it would increase its focus on this issue. In the 
UK, this issue— as I understand it, but I would defer to my legal expert here—is not 
one where we, the FSA, have an ability to bring a criminal case”.176 
 
Further uncertainty was also expressed by Tracey McDermott who added “we are not a 
general fraud prosecutor … we have spent quite a lot of time and energy on prosecuting both 
section 397 offences and indeed insider dealing offences … we do not have is a remit to 
prosecute false accounting, conspiracy”.177  However, it is strongly suggested that the FSA 
does have the regulatory remit to prosecute certain fraudulent activity based on the following 
cases.  For example, in March 2000 the regulator successfully prosecuted Paul Haslam, for 
breaches of the Banking Act 1987.
178
  Furthermore, in February 2008, the William Anthony 
‘Robin’ Radclyffe was successfully prosecuted and convicted of a series of offences under 
the Theft Acts, the Financial Services Act 1986 and FSMA 2000.  The defendant, who was 
not authorised by the regulator, made a series of false and misleading statements to his 
clients.
179
  The regulator stated “our prosecution of this case is indicative of the FSAs 
determination to deter wrongdoing of this sort”.180  Therefore, it is unsurprising that The HM 
Treasury Select Committee criticised the decision of the regulator not to initiate criminal 
proceedings in relation to LIBOR: 
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“The FSA’s decision whether to initiate a criminal prosecution should not be influenced 
by the fact that its income is derived from firms which it regulates. The FSA has an 
obligation under section 2(1)(b) of FSMA to discharge its functions in the way in which 
it considers most appropriate for the purpose of meeting its regulatory objectives. 
Under section 2(2)(d) the reduction of financial crime is one of these objectives. 
Financial crime is defined in section 6(3) as including not only misconduct in relation 
to a financial market but also any criminal offence of fraud or dishonesty. The FSA 
took a narrow view of its power to initiate criminal proceedings for fraudulent conduct 
in this case”.181 
 
This was also supported by George Osborne who stated that the then legislation contained 
“gaping holes” and that amendments would be made to the Financial Services Act 2012.182  
Therefore, the inability of the regulator to prosecute those involved in financial crime during 
the financial crisis must be criticised.   
 
Conclusion 
  
The regulatory response to the financial crisis in the UK resulted in the publication of 
numerous reports, consultation papers, the creation of new regulatory agencies, the 
introduction of new legislation and new misconduct related criminal offences.  The former 
Labour government must be credited with actually attempting to tackle financial crime 
attempting to forge a response that combined financial regulation with a series of financial 
crime measure, including the financial crime statutory objective.  The regulator has continued 
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to adopt its credible deterrence strategy which has resulted in the continued imposition of 
financial sanctions on both firms and individuals who have breached its regulations.  The 
regulator has imposed record levels of financial penalties on those firms who have 
manipulated LIBOR and FOREX, yet they decided against instigating criminal proceedings 
and left that with the SFO.  The decision over whether or not they were able to bring criminal 
proceedings in relation to LIBOR remains unclear as the evidence provided above suggests 
that the regulator did have the ability to initiate criminal proceedings for fraud despite its 
contradictory statements.  Nonetheless, the regulator must be credited for increasing the 
number of insider dealing convictions and how it has vigorously enforced the market abuse 
regime.  However, the regulator must be criticised for its initial response to LIBOR, which 
amounted to nothing more than playing regulatory tennis with the SFO with the most serious 
financial scandal in the UK since the collapse of Barings Bank.  The Coalition government 
have not continued to follow the financial crime strategies introduced by the former Labour 
government.  One of the major criticisms of the response to financial crime emanating from 
the financial crisis has been the lack of criminal prosecutions.  During the height of the 
financial crisis, and whilst leader of the Conservative party, David Cameron boldly 
proclaimed that the City of London faced a “Day of Reckoning” and that severe penalties 
would be imposed for those bankers whose reckless activities causes the financial crisis.
183
 
During his ‘Day of Reckoning’ speech, David Cameron stressed the importance of 
punishment and deterrence and stated: 
 
“[the] most important step we must take in enforcing responsibility in the City is to 
make sure that when rules are broken, and culprits are found, they are properly 
punished. That’s only fair - because those responsible must be held to account … 
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around the world, bankers sat up and took notice not when global finance ministers 
issued some new communiqué on unauthorized speculative trading - it was when Nick 
Leeson was caught and put behind bar … the problem in Britain … is that there just 
doesn’t seem to be the will to see appropriate justice done at the highest level. Not from 
the Government. And not much will evident in the FSA either”.184 
 
A number of interesting points can be raised from this section of the speech.  For example, 
David Cameron stated that when “rules are broken, and culprits are found, they are properly 
punished”.  This raises a very important question, how many of those who are responsible for 
the financial crisis or contributed to it have been held accountable? The answer at the time of 
writing is very few, only one trader has been convicted for the manipulation of LIBOR and 
many more have been acquitted.  Furthermore, not one director of a bank has been 
disqualified under the Company Director Disqualification Act 1986.  Therefore, the response 
towards financial crime during and after the financial crisis hasn’t dramatically altered and it 
is likely that the regulator will continue to impose ‘media friendly’ financial penalties and err 
on the side of caution when attempting to instigate criminal proceedings.  It seems that the 
culprits of the financial crisis will continue to avoid any meaningful consequences for their 
actions.   
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